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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
EQUJTRADE INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
and JAMES ALAN WEST, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
LEE ANNE BUSMAN, 
Defendant. 
ClVJL ACTION FILE NO. 
2017CV286507 
Business Case Div. 4 
FINAL ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND CLOSING CASE 
The above styled action 1s before the Court on Defendant Lee Alme Busman's 
(Defendant "Busman?') Motion for Summary Judgment. Having considered the entire record and 
argument of counsel at a March 15, 2019 hearing held in this matter, the Court finds as follows: 
SUMMARY OFF ACTS 
This case has a protracted and tortured history that stems from a 2013 business 
transaction involving Plaintiff Equitrade International, Inc. ("EI") and its Chief Executive 
Officer, James Alan West (Plaintiff "West"), on one side and Barter Consultants International, 
lnc. ("BCI") and its former President/Chief Executive Officer, Defendant Busman, on the other. 
That transaction has now spawned three lawsuits in this Court.' 
It appears Defendant was formerly known as Lee Anne Busman but is now known as Lee Anne Hearn. 
Because the pleadings and relevant documents for the most part refer to Defendant as Lee Anne Busman, she will be 
referred lo herein as Defendant "Busman." 
2 See also Eguitrade International. Inc. and James Alan West v. Lee Anne Busman. individually. Barter 
Consultants International. Jnc .• and Lee Anne, Inc .. Superior Court of Fulton County, No. 20 l 3CY233445 ("2013 
Action"); Eguitrade International. Inc. and James Alan West v. Lee Anne Busman. Superior Court of Fulton County, 
No. 20 l 7CY289468("2017 Action for Injunctive Relief} 
Defendant Busman's ex-husband-Bob Busman-started BCI in December 1999. As 
described by Defendant, the company provided alternative currency which business owners 
could use in running their companies by using what was termed BCl "Trade Dollars." Clients 
would earn Trade Dollars by selling their goods and services and could spend Trade Dollars by 
purchasing other active members' goods and services. Defendant and Bob Busman divorced in 
201 l and pursuant to their divorce agreement Defendant was given tbe business. She became the 
Chief Executive Officer of BCI in April 2011. 
Altb.ough the parties differ in how they describe the transaction, sometime between 2012 
and March 2013 El and BCI reached an agreement whereby BCI would "join" or merge with EI 
in a new joint venture to be known as "Equitrade Atlanta" (the "2013 Merger Agreement"). 
According to Plaintiff. Equitrade Atlanta was to absorb the BCI members and EI would provide 
management services to those members. However, disputes soon arose between the parties, 
including allegations that, e.g., Defendant diverted Equitrade Atlanta funds to her personal use; 
Defendant refused to allow Equitrade Atlanta to pay EI for U1e goods and services provided; 
Plaintiffs locked Defendant out of the BCI/EI office and refused to allow her access to ber 
personal office and belongings; and Plaintiffs learned there was a previously undisclosed tax lien 
against BCJ that should have prevented the sale or transfer of any assets of BCI. 
On July 3, 2013, Plaintiffs initiated the 2013 Action against Defendant Busman, BCI, and 
Lee Anne, Inc. (an entity formed by Defendant to be the majority member of Equitrade Atlanta). 
In that action Plaintiffs asserted claims against the named defendants for: breach of the 2013 
Merger Agreement for failing to remit payment to EI for services rendered; fraud and 
misrepresentation for purporting lo enter into the 2013 Merger Agreement when a tax lien 
existed against BCT and an agent of BC1 had falsely reported to the Internal Revenue Service 
2 
("IRS") that BCI was "defunct" and had no assets; conversion regarding Busman's diversion of 
funds from Equitrade Atlanta; a claim for "bad faith"; a request for injunctive relief and a 
protective order; quantum meruit; and attorney's fees. 
The 2013 Action was originally assigned to the Honorable Constance C. Russell. The 
parties appeared before Judge Russell on July 18, 2013 and announced that they had reached a 
settlement agreement the terms of which were described in open court and transcribed in a 
"Transcript of Settlement Agreement." At that proceeding, counsel for the parties" described the 
settlement terms, Judge Russell made various inquiries regarding certain terms, and the parties 
with counsel at various points conferred and then would address Judge Russell on the record. In 
particular, there was considerable discussion regarding the outstanding debt owed to the IRS 
described as the IRS "Trust Fund Debt", the exact amount of which was unknown at the time. 
The parties/counsel discussed, e.g., what would happen if the debt was more than anticipated, if 
they were not able to negotiate that debt down with the IRS, what was meant by the term "Trust 
Fund Debt" and if that is a term of art understood by all of the parties. Judge Russell in particular 
pressed the parties regarding the ta,'< issue and the patties/counsel's understanding of the term 
"Trust Fund Debt": 
The Court: Okay. My only question was, the term that they have used is 
"Trust Fund Debt." Do you all have a shared understanding of what "Trust 
Fund Debt" means so that if something happens that isn't quite what you 
had in mind, we all know what "Trust Fund Debt" means? Does it have a 
meaning in the J.R.S. Code or is it a term that you-all have come up with? 
Does it have a shared meaning? 
Mr. Gordon: It's LR.S. terminology, your honor, that they said has to be 
paid in order for this debt to be satisfied. 
3 Affidavit of Lee Anne Hearn (f/k/a Lee Anne Busman), Ex. I (Transcript of Settlement Agreement Before 
the Honorable Constance C. Russell, Atlanta Judicial Circuit, July 18, 2013; herein "Transcript of Settlement 
Agreement"). 
4 Sims Gordon, Esq. appeared on behalf of El and West and Leighton B. Deming, Jr., Esq. appeared on 
behalf of Busman, BC! and Lee Anne, Inc. 
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The Court: All right. So, "Trust Fund Debt" has an understood meaning 
in federal courls. If you're ever having a fight about what "Trust Fund 
Debt" is, the l.R.S. can tell us what it is. 
Mr. Gordon: Yeah, that's correct, Your Honor. 
The Court: Mr. Deming, is that right? Do you have a shared 
understanding as to what "Trust Fund Debt" means? 
Mr. Deming: No. I'Il tell you why. I deal with the I.R.S. all the time. And 
I have to deal here with any I.R.S. debt that's owed. Which is - - it is Trust 
Fund, but that penalties and interest [sic]; they've agreed to sell it for 
$38,500, fine. 
The Court: They who has agreed? 
Mr. Deming: The I.R.S. 
The Court: Who - - Okay, the l.R.S. is not here. 
Mr. Deming: I know. 
The Court: So, you-all are assuming that the I.R.S. has said $38,500 and 
that that is in fact going to work out; and it may very well, okay .... 
Mr. Deming: Or Jess. 
Mr. Gordon: Your honor, may I - - may I shed some light on it. You 
know, J handle a big volume of bankruptcy cases, and so what we 
generally do in those cases - - and this is why we feel like, you know, it 
should be the Trust Fund Debt, your honor, because the Trust Fund Debt 
cannot be wiped out We can wipe out the other debt. Right now B.C.l. 
won't have any assets, so it means they can file bankruptcy and wipe it all 
out. 
The Court: Let me explain something to you. 
Mr. Gordon: Yes, yes. 
The Court: I'm not trying to resolve your settlement deal. I don't care 
what your deal is.1 simply want you-all, when you walk out of here, to be 
clear about what your deal is. So if you tell me that "Trust Fund Debt" has 
a specific meaning and they don't agree that it means the same thing, you 
don't have a shared understanding. 
Mr. Gordon: Give me one second. 
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(The parties confer.) 
Mr. Deming: They'll do it. 
Mr. Gordon: Okay, thank you. I think we have a shared meaning. 
Mr. Deming: That was correct, wasn't it? 
Ms. Collier: Yes, sir. 
The Court: All right. You may keep reading. 
Mr. Gordon: Thank you. 
The Court: And just remember, Mr. West, Ms. Busman, if you don't 
stand up, you live with what they say. Go ahead ... 5 
At the conclusion of the proceeding Judge Russell noted the parties' agreement had been 
read into the record and declared: "Based upon the representations of counsel and the affirmative 
responses of the parties, it's accepted by the court."6 Although the parties were to "close" the 
agreement by August 9, 2013, they ultimateJy failed to close the settlement. 
On or about August 7. 2013, the IRS sent "Sims W. Gordon, Jr. Attorney for James Alan 
West" a notice of the liens on BCI's tax debt.' According to the notice: "The amount owed on 
the tax liabilities included on the notice(s) of federal tax lien filed against Barter Consullants 
International is $140.676.80 computed to 09/05/2013." 
On August 15, 2013, the 2013 Action was transferred to this Court. After additional 
negotiations, on July 18, 2014, the parties reached a settlement and executed a Settlement 
Agreement and General Mutual Release (the "Settlement Agreement")." Under the Settlement 
5 
8 
Affidavit of Lee Anne Hearn (f/k/a Lee Anne Busman), Ex. I (Transcript of Settlement Agreement before 
the Honorable Constance C. Russell, Atlanta Judicial Circuit, July 18, 2013; herein "Transcript of Settlement 
Agreement") at pp. 7-9. 
6 1.Q,_ at p. 15. 
Affidavit of Lee Anne Hearn (f/k/a Lee Anne Busman), Ex. 2 {IRS August 7, 2013 BCI Tax Notice). 
Affidavit of Lee Anne Hearn (f/k/a Lee Anne Busman), Ex. 3 (Settlement Agreement and General Mutual 
Release). 
5 
Agreement EI and/or West were to pay Busman, individually, $72,000.00 at a rate of $1,500.00 
per month for 48 consecutive months in payments made payable to the Kevin T. Moore, P.C. 
IOLTA Trust Account." The parties also executed a Consent Judgment which could be filed with 
the Court for entry upon submission of an affidavit from Busman's counsel of nonpayment and 
default by El/West." 
The Settlement Agreement included a provrsion specifically addressing the "Internal 
Revenue Service Debt": 
5. Internal Revenue Service Debt. There is an Internal Revenue Service 
Trust Fund debt, which is owed. James West and/or Equitrade 
International, Inc. have agreed and shall become responsible for and 
assume the entire Trust Fund Debt and the charges directly associated 
therewith owed to the Internal Revenue Service on behalf of Lee Anne 
Busman and Barter Consultants International, Inc. and shall 
indemnify and hold harmless Lee Anne Busman and Barter 
Consultants International, Inc. for said debt so owed to the Internal 
Revenue Service. Lee Anne Busman will execute any and all documents 
needful and necessary to allow James West and Equitrade International, 
Inc. to be abJe to speak with the f nternal Revenue Service to negotiate 
and/or pay the owned amount to the Internal Revenue Service. James West 
will notify and provide to Kevin T. Moore, Esq. evidence when all 
amounts owed to the Internal Revenue Service are paid in full within five 
business days of receipt of documentation evidencing foll satisfaction of 
debt [sic]. 11 
The Settlement Agreement also included broad mutual releases of all cJaims: 
3. Mutual Releases. For and in consideration of the monies to be paid and 
mutual agreement to waive all past, present, and future claims the Parties 
may have against each other related to the Superior Court litigation, the 
parties do hereby, on behalf of themselves, their respective former and 
current agents, attorneys, officers, managers, directors, employees, 
associated companies, affiliated companies subsidiaries, sureties, and 
successors and assigns, do hereby release and forever discharge the 
other party(ies) named or described above from any and all lawsuits, 
causes of action, claims, demands, costs, and obligations of any kind 
9 Affidavit of Lee Anne Hearn (Ilk/a Lee Anne Busman), Ex. 3 (Settlement Agreement and General Mutual 
Release) at ,i I. 
10 & at,i2. 
11 & at ~5 ( emphasis added). 
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or nature whatsoever, both known and unknown, to person and property, 
which have resulted in the past, which exist at present, or which may 
in the future arise related to the Superior Court litigation and/or the 
relationship among any of the Parties hereto as of the date of this 
Agreement. THJS IS A FULL MUTUAL RELEASE AND SHALL BE 
CONSTRUED AS BROADLY AS POSSIBLE TO CONSTITUTE A 
FULL, FfNAL AND COMPLETE RELEASE OF THE RELEASED 
PARTIES FROM ALL CLAIMS, DEMANDS, DAMAGES AND 
CAUSES OF ACTION. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this release shall 
not extend to any claims arising from a breach of this Agreement. 12 
Beginning in August 2014, Busman received monthly payments of $1,500 per the 
Settlement Agreement for IO months. Thereafter she did not receive any other payments.':' 
Busman avers that West falsely informed the IRS that the $72,000 owed to her was in payment 
for a customer list that had previously belonged to BC!. However, Busman alleges that assertion 
was false as EI had possession and use of the customer list for at least three (3) years prior to the 
parties' settlement." Nevertheless, as a result, it appears the IRS issued a Notice of Levy with 
respect to BCJ to withhold all payments made by EI and/or West to the Law Firm of Kevin T. 
Moore, P.C. on behalf of Lee Anne Busman. 
Upon the failure of Plaintiffs to continue to make payments to Busman pursuant to the 
Settlement Agreement, this Court ultimately entered the parties' Consent Judgment, granting 
Busman a money judgement in the amount of $72,000 (minus payments previously made). The 
Court also denied Plaintiffs' motions seeking to set aside that judgment, finding that under the 
Settlement Agreement, EI and West were obligated to pay money to Busman, individually, and 
to satisfy BCl's Trust Fund Debt on behalf of Busman and BCI.'5 The Court specifically found: 
By submitting the payments due to [Busman] to the IRS in satisfaction of 
the tax debt, Plaintiffs are not satisfying the letter or the spirit of the 
12 Affidavit of Lee Anne Hearn (13/k/a Lee Anne Busman), Ex. 3 (Settlement Agreement and General Mutual 
Release) at ~3 (capitalized emphasis in original; bold emphasis added). 
13 Affidavit of Lee Anne Hearn (f/k/a Lee Anne Busman) at ~20. 
14 Id. at ~21. 
15 2013 Action, Order entered October I 0. 2016. 
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Settlement Agreement. Instead they are using money owed to [Busman] 
to satisfy the IRS debt that they also agreed to pay. West and Equitrade 
cannot avoid their obligation to pay past due taxes on the Trust Fund Debt 
by redirecting the $72,000 owed individually to [Busman] to the IRS.16 
Separately, Busman initiated garnishment proceedings against Plaintiffs. Amid ongoing 
disputes regarding whether Plaintiffs had satisfied their obligations under the Settlement 
Agreement, including with respect to paying the IRS debt and the sums owed to Busman 
personally, Plaintiffs initiated this action on February 24, 2017. They then filed the 2017 Action 
for Injunctive Relief on May 2. 2017, seeking a temporary restraining order, preliminary 
injunction, and permanent injunction for injunctive relief prohibiting Busman "from engaging in 
any further discovery and collection efforts against Plaintiffs, through garnishment, levy or 
otherwise pending the foll adjudication of this cause."17 
Plaintiffs concede that under the Settlement Agreement they agreed to pay the Trust Fund 
Debt. Plaintiffs assert they did so but. upon receipt of a formal Notice of Levy directing them to 
remit to the IRS aJI payments due to Defendant Busman, they thereafter directed their payments 
to the IRS as directed. 18 Plaintiffs also contend that they have satisfied the Trust Fund Debt in 
full. Specifically, Plaintiffs requested confirmation from the IRS of the amount due solely under 
the Trust Fund Debt and received written confirmation OJ1 June 9, 2015 that the outstanding Trust 
Fund Debt was $15,754.77.19 Plaintiffs assert they thereafter engaged in investigations that 
revealed a number of both state liabilities (Georgia Department of Revenue and Georgia 
Department of Labor) and federal tax liabilities. 
16 2013 Action, Order entered October I 0, 2016, p. 7. 
See 2017 Action for Injunctive Relief, Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order. Preliminary Injunction, 
and Permanent Injunction, p. 2. The 2017 Action for Injunctive Relief was transferred to this Court on September 
29, 2017. The Court denied Plaintiffs' requests for injunctive relief on December 5, 20 I 7 and ultimately dismissed 
the action on November I 6, 2018. 
18 Verified Complaint, Ex. C (Notice of Levy). 
19 Verified Complaint, Ex. D (IRS letter dated June 9, 2015 from L. Jones, Revenue Officer). The Court notes 
that the letter states "the total of the trust fund recovery penalty today is$ I 5,754.77" (emphasis added). 
17 
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Of the federal liabilities, allegedly $3,233.00 are for 1120 taxes (income tax liabilities); 
$352.18 are for 940 taxes (unemployment tax liabilities); together resulting in 6721 civil 
penalties of over $54,000. Plaintiffs allege these liabilities and the Georgia Department of 
Revenue and Department of Labor liabilities were not disclosed at any time and that Defendant 
claimed that her taxes were current. According to Plaintiffs: 
Tbe June 9, 2015 correspondence, balance of payments remitted to the 
IRS in satisfaction of the Levy Notices, and total Liens and FfF As 
outstanding upon BCI and Defendant make it clear that the Levy Notices 
served upon Plaintiffs are not for the Trust f und debt, but for other 
unrelated federal income tax, state income tax and Department of Labor 
liabilities. 
The unrelated federal income tax, state income tax and Department of 
Labor liabilities not comprising the Trust Fund debt (a) have been in 
existence since prior to the purported sale by Defendant of the assets of 
BCI and liabilities of Defendant and BCI to EI; (b) have been known by 
Defendant since prior to the purported sale by Defendant of the assets of 
BCI and liabilities of Defendant and BCI to EI; and (c) relate to debts of 
Defendant and imposed upon the assets of BCJ acquired from Defendant, 
all of which Defendant knowingly, purposefully and fervently withheld.20 
Plaintiffs also alleges Busman had actual notice of each of the I iens and FIF As in existence since 
prior to the filing of the 2013 Action. creation of the July 18, 2013 Transcript of Settlement 
Agreement before Judge Russell, and negotiations that resulted in the Settlement Agreement. 
In this action, Plaintiffs assert claims against Defendant Busman for: (1) fraud in the 
factum; (2) fraud in the inducement; and (3) unjust enrichment. Defendant Busman, in tum, 
asserts counterclaims against EI and West, alleging they are attempting to avoid collection of the 
sums owed to Busman by filing this lawsuit related to U1e same dispute and tax issues addressed 
in the 20 I 3 Action. Busman asserts claims against El and West for: (I) fraud and 
misrepresentation; (2) conversion/trover; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) punitive damages; and (5) 
"stubborn litigiousness" (seeking attorney's fees and costs under O.C.G.A. §13-6-11). 
20 Consolidated Pre-Trial Order. i]6 (Plaintiffs' outline of the case and contentions) alp. 7. 
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ANALYSIS 
I. DEFENDANTS' MOTJON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. Standard on Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment should be granted only when the rnovant shows "that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." O.C.G.A. § 9-J 1-56(c). "A defendant may do this by showing the court that the 
documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no 
evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiffs case." 
Scarbrough v. Hallam, 240 Ga. App. 829,830.525 S.E.2d 377,378 (1999) (quoting Lau's Corp. 
v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491,491.405 S.E.2d 474, 475-76 (1991). To avoid summary judgment, "an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere al legations or denials of his pleading, but his response, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in [O.C.G.A. §9-11-56), must set forth specific facts 
showing tbat there is a genuine issue for trial." O.C.G.A. §9-1 l-56(e). 
"[A]t the summary judgment stage, courts are required to construe the evidence most 
favorably towards the nonmoving party, who is given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and 
possible inferences." Smith v. Tenet Health Sys. SpaJding. Inc., 327 Ga. App. 878, 879, 761 
S.E.2d 409, 411 (2014) (citations and punctuation omitted). See Word v. Henderson, 220 Ga. 
846, 848, 142 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1965) ("Where the evidence on motion for summary judgment is 
ambiguous or doubtful. the party opposing the motion must be given tbe benefit of all reasonable 
doubts and of all favorable inferences and such evidence construed most favorably to the 
opposing party opposing the motion"). However, "[m]ere speculation, conjecture, or possibility 
[are] insufficient to preclude summary judgment." State v. Rozier, 288 Ga. 767, 768 (2011) 
(quoting Rosales v. Davis, 260 Ga. App. 709, 712, 580 S.E.2d 662,665 (2003)). 
10 
B. Conclusions of Law 
Defendant Busman has moved for summary judgment with respect to all claims asserted 
against her. The Court is compelled to note that Defendant filed her Motion for Summary 
Judgment on September 17, 2018. On October 10, 2018, Plaintiff El filed a Notice of Request for 
Mediation. On October 24, 2018, EI filed Plaintiff Equitrade International, [oc.'s Response and 
Reservation of Right to File Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In that filing El includes its "Statement of Facts in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment" but does not include citations to the record other than generally 
incorporating by reference Defendant Busman's entire deposition. 
In the foregoing filing EI argues Defendant's motion should be denied because: factual 
questions exist regarding "the extent to which Defendant's acts may be deemed to be Fraud in 
the Factum and/or Fraud in the inducement and result in Unjust Enrichment to Defendant"; and 
there is evidence of "Defendant's actual knowledge of tax liabilities of BCI not disclosed to 
Plaintiffs prior to the formation of Equitrade Atlanta, prior to the initial Trial Transcript 
Settlement Agreement, prior to the formation of Equitrade Atlanta [sic], prior to the settlement 
reduced to Transcript, the Settlement Agreement [sic], and prior to Defendant's acts of 
garnishment.t'[' El's filing also includes a "Request for Accommodation" (requesting an 
accommodation in the late filing of tbe response citing an injury suffered by Plaintiff's counsel 
on September 26 2018 and counsel's belief the response had been timely filed by office staff) 
and a "Request to Reserve Right to File Brief' whereby EI purports to reserve its right to file a 
11 Plaintiff Equitrade International. lnc.'s Response and Reservation of Right to File Brief in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. p. 5. 
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brief in support of its response "unless this Court requests otherwise." However, no supplemental 
response has been submitted by EI. 
Plaintiff James Alan West, who according lo the parties' Consolidated Pre-Trial Order is 
appearing in this matter pro se, did not file any response to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and be did not appear at the March 15, 20 l 9 hearing. See Rapps v. Cooke, 234 Ga. 
App. 131, 131-32, 505 S.E.2d 566,568 (1998) ("A failure to respond to a motion for summary 
judgment results in waiver of the right to present evidence in opposition to the motion, but the 
moving party must still show from the pleadings and the evidence that summary judgment is 
appropriate"); Fowler v. Smith, 237 Ga. App. 841,842.516 S.E.2d 845,847 (1999) (same). 
At the request of and with the consent of all parties, the Court deferred consideration of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on multiple occasions to allow the parties an 
opportunity to privately mediate their dispute and to obtain necessary tax documents from the 
IRS to inform their settlement discussions. See, e.g., Scheduling Order entered November 16, 
2018; Amended Scheduling Order entered December 14, 20 I 8; and Order Continuing and 
Resetting Summary Judgment Hearing entered on March 4, 2019. In short, the parties have been 
afforded ample opportunity to pursue mediation, to attempt to negotiate a settlement of their 
dispute, to obtain necessary information with respect to their claims and defenses, and to address 
the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. 
J. Fraud claims 
Fraud in the factum and fraud in the inducement are species of fraud. Specifically, fraud 
in the factum is "the sort of fraud that procures a party's signature to an instrument without 
knowledge of its true nature or contents." Bellamy v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 266 Ga. 630, 631, 
469 S.E.2d 182, 184 (1996) (citation omitted). See, e.g, Straus v. Renasant Bank, 326 Ga. App. 
12 
271, 275, 756 S.E.2d 340, 344 (2014) (where lender brought action against borrower aod 
personal guarantors to collect unpaid loan, finding the guarantors' claim of fraud in the factum 
was not supported because the evidence showed they knew they were signing a guaranty such 
that they could not contend their signature was procured without knowledge of the true nature of 
the document they were signing). 
"To establish a claim for fraud in the inducement, or inceptive fraud to enter into a 
contract, a plaintiff must prove both that the defendant failed to perform a promised act and that 
the defendant bad no intention of performing when the promise was made." Nash v. Roberts 
Ridge Funding, LLC. 305 Ga. App. 113, 116-17, 699 S.E.2d 100, 102 (2010) (citing Cowart v. 
Gay, 223 Ga. 635, 636-637(1): 157 S.E.2d 466 (1967)). "Evidence showing nothing more than 
the parties' disagreement regarding the interpretation of a contract's terms is inadequate to 
support an inceptive fraud claim." Nash, 305 Ga. App. at 117 (citations omitted). 
As explained by the Court of Appeals of Georgia: 
[T]he test of the defense of fraud in the factum is that of excusable 
ignorance of the contents of the writing signed. The party must not only 
have been in ignorance, but must also have had no reasonable opportunity 
to obtain knowledge. The primary difference between these two types of 
fraud [i.e. fraud in the factum and fraud in the inducement] lies in the 
parties' understanding of the contract into which they are entering. lf a 
party understands the nature of the contract [it is] executing but contends 
that there has been some material misrepresentation as to the obligations 
[a]rising thereunder, only a fraud in the inducement claim will lie. 
Straus, 326 Ga. App. at 275 (quoting Bank of the Ozarks v. Khan, 903 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1378(1ll) 
(N.D.Ga.2012)). 
Importantly, "[i]n order to prove fraud, the plaintiff must establish five elements: (I) a 
false representation by a defendant, (2) scienter, (3) intention to induce the plaintiff to act or 
refrain from acting, (4) justifiable reliance by plaintiff, and (5) damage to plaintiff." Engelman v. 
13 
Kessler, 340 Ga. App. 239, 246, 797 S.E.2d 160, 166 (2017) (citing Suo Nurseries. Inc. v. Lake 
Erma. LLC, 316 Ga.App. 832, 835 (1 ), 730 S.E.2d 556 (2012)). 
As to the element of justifiable reliance, it is not sufficient to show that 
false representations were knowingly made with an intent to deceive- 
there must also be proof that due care was exercised to discover the fraud. 
Charter Med. Mirmt. Co. v. Ware Manor. Inc .. 159 Ga.App. 378, 380, 283 
S.E.2d 330 (1981 ). "Misrepresentations are not actionable unless the 
complaining party was justified in relying thereon in the exercise of 
common prudence and diligence." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. 
at 383,283 S.E.2d 330. Moreover, a party is not justified in relying on and 
assuming to be true representations consisting of mere expressions of 
opinion, hope, expectation, puffing, and the like; rather, representations of 
this nature must be inquired into and examined to ascertain the truth. Id.; 
Wilkinson v. Walker, 143 Ga.App. 838,839,240 S.E.2d 210 (I 977). 
Todd v. Martinez Paint & Body. Inc., 238 Ga. App. 128, 128-29, 517 S.E.2d 844,846 (1999). 
Here, with respect to the fraud in the factum claim, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs 
signed or otherwise entered into any agreement "without knowledge of its true nature or 
contents." Moreover, the record and protracted nature of the parties' settlement negotiations from 
2013 plainJy belie any assertion by Plaintiffs that they had no reasonable opportunity to obtain 
knowledge regarding the agreements they were entering into. To the extent Plaintiffs claim some 
fraud, misunderstanding or misrepresentation regarding the nature or contents of the 2013 
Merger Agreement, any claims arising thereunder were mutually released under the parties' 
Settlement Agreement. 
Further, to the extent Plaintiffs claim some fraud, misunderstanding or misrepresentation 
regarding the nature or contents of the executed Settlement Agreement, including what taxes 
were in dispute and what taxes constituted the "Trust Fund Debt" to be paid by Plaintiffs, again 
the record belies this contention. As noted above, the parties with the full benefit of counsel had 
an extensive discussion among themselves and with Judge Russell at the July 1.8, 2013 
proceeding about the tax issues relevant to the parties' dispute. Thus, they were plainly on notice 
14 
of those issues which were ultimately addressed in the Settlement Agreement executed a year 
later on July 18, 2014. Moreover, there is record evidence that on or about August 7, 2013 
(before the written Settlement Agreement was executed) the IRS sent Plaintiffs' counsel a notice 
indicating that as of September 5, 2013 "[t]he amount owed on the tax liabilities included on the 
notice(s) of federal tax lien filed against" BCI were $140,676.80. Thus, Plaintiffs were well 
aware of the federal liens against BCI before they executed the Settlement Agreement in 2014. 
Additionally, to succeed on either fraud claim, Plaintiffs must show justifiable reliance, 
i.e. "there must also be proof that due care was exercised to discover the fraud." Todd, 238 Ga. 
App. at 128-29. In light of the protracted discussions and negotiations surrounding the tax 
liabilities at issue, admissions during the July 18, 2013 proceeding before Judge Russell that the 
parties were not sure of the exact amount that was owed, and the August 7, 2013 notice provided 
by the IRS, it is plainly clear that Plaintiffs were on notice of the tax issues. Plaintiffs, thus, had 
an obligation to exercise due care before settling their claims and ultimately agreeing to "become 
responsible for and assume the entire Trust Fund Debt and the charges directly associated 
therewith owed to the Internal Revenue Service on behalf of Lee Ann [isc] Busman and Barter 
Consultants International, Inc." 
Having failed to do so, Plaintiffs' fraud claims fail as a matter of law and the parties are 
bound by their executed Settlement Agreement. Notably, under the Settlement Agreement 
Plaintiffs not only expressly "agreed to be responsible for and assume the entire Trust Fund Debt 
and the charges directly associated therewith owed to the [lRS] on behalf of [Defendant] and 
[BCI]," they also expressly agreed to "indemnify and hold harmless [Defendant] and [BCI] for 
said debt so owed to the [IRS]." These undisputed facts undercut Plaintiffs' theories of recovery 
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entirely. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to the fraud in the factum and fraud in 
the inducement claims is hereby GRANTED. 
2. Unjust Enrichment 
"[U]njust enrichment applies when as a matter of fact there is no legal contract ... but 
where tbe party sought to be charged has been conferred a benefit by the party contending an 
unjust enrichment which the benefited party equitably ought to return or compensate for." 
Engram v. Engram, 265 Ga. 804,806,463 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1995) (quoting Smith v. McClung, 215 
Ga. App. 786, 789(3), 452 S.E.2cl 229 ( 1994)). 
"The theory of unjust enrichment is basically an equitable doctrine that the 
benefitted party equitably ought to either return or compensate for the 
conferred benefits when there was no legal contract to pay." (Citations 
omitted.) Hollifield v. Monte Vista Biblical Gardens, 251 Ga.App. 124, 
l 30(2)(c), 553 S.E.2d 662 (2001 ). "The concept of unjust enrichment in 
law is premised upon the principle that a party cannot induce, accept, or 
encourage another to furnish or render something of value to such party 
and avoid payment for the value received." (Citation and punctuation 
omitted.) ld. at 131(2)(c), 553 S.E.2d 662. For unjust enrichment to apply, 
"the party conferring the labor and things of value must act with the 
expectation that the other will be responsible for the cost." Id. Otherwise, 
that party, like one who volunteers to pay the debt of another, has no right 
to an equitable recovery. Id. 
Morris v. Britt, 275 Ga. App. 293, 294, 620 S.E.2d 422, 424 (2005). "[A] claim for unjust 
enrichment is not a tort, but an alternative theory of recovery if a contract claim fails." Wachovia 
Ins. Servs .. Inc. v. Fallon, 299 Ga. App. 440, 449, 682 S.E.2d 657, 665 (2009) (quoting Tidilcis v. 
Network for Med., etc., 274 Ga. App. 807. 811(2), 619 S.E.2d 481 (2005)). Thus, ·'[a]n unjust 
enrichment theory does not lie where there is an express contract." Donchi. Inc. v. Robdol. LLC, 
283 Ga. App. 161,167,640 S.E.2d 719, 724 (2007) (quoting Pryor v. CCEC. lnc., 257 Ga.App. 
450, 452(4), 571 S.E.2d 454 (2002)). 
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Here, Plaintiffs allege the following constitutes an unjust enrichment to Defendant 
Busman: "[r]eceipt of the payments due under the Settlement Agreement while receiving the 
benefit of payments of the same amount to the IRS for and on behalf of Defendant"; [r]eceipt of 
the funds by Defendants for the sale of BCI's assets when the assets are subject to multiple liens 
which liens have resulted in levies being satisfied by Plaintiffs"; and "[r]eceipt by Defendant of 
funds through garnishment and other collection efforts bypassing the IRS liens and levy being 
satisfied by Plaintiffs."? 
However, the money to be paid to Busman personally and the separate "Internal Revenue 
Service Debt" assumed by EI/West are express provisions of the parties' written Settlement 
Agreement. As such, as a matter of law a claim for unjust enrichment will not lie for disputes 
arising thereunder. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the 
unjust enrichment claim is GRANTED. 
II. DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS 
As noted above, in this action Busman asserts counterclaims against EI and West for: 
(1) fraud and misrepresentation; (2) conversion/trover; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) punitive 
damages; and (5) "stubborn litigiousness" (seeking attorney's fees and costs under O.C.G.A. 
§ 13-6-11 ). As discussed at the March 15, 2019 hearing and as agreed by all parties/counsel 
present at the hearing, the foregoing claims are duplicative and/or seek duplicative relief as has 
already been awarded to Busman under the Consent Judgment that was issued in the 2013 
Action. As such, the Court hereby DISMISSES Defendant's counterclaims. 
22 Verified Complaint,~~ 69-71. 
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CONCLUSION 
Having considered the entire record and given all of the above: Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is GRANTED; and Defendant's counterclaims are DTSMlSSED without 
objection by Defendant. Insofar as there are no remaining claims for adjudication in this action, 
this constitutes a FINAL ORDER in this matter and the Clerk of the Court is directed to mark 
this case CLOSED. 
SO ORDERED this -1.!Z._ day of March, 2019. 
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